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ANNELISE RILES
Cornell University

Real time:
Unwinding technocratic and anthropological knowledge

A B S T R A C T
‘‘The Bank of Japan is our mother,’’ bankers in
Tokyo sometimes said of Japan’s central bank.
Drawing on this metaphor as an ethnographic
resource, and on the example of central bankers
who sought to unwind their own technocratic
knowledge by replacing it with a real-time
machine, I retrace the ethnographic task of
unwinding technocratic knowledge from those
anthropological knowledge practices that critique
technocracy. In so doing, I draw attention to
special methodological problems—involving the
relationship between ethnography, analysis, and
reception—in the representation and critique of
contemporary knowledge practices. [risk, finance,
economics, regulation, bureaucracy, expert
knowledge, Japan]

n his classic midcentury critique of U.S. politics, Theodore Roszak
assails the technocracy as ‘‘that society in which those who govern
justify themselves by appeal to technical experts who, in turn, justify
themselves by appeal to scientific forms of knowledge. And beyond the authority of science there is no appeal’’ (1969:8). Like other
theorists of his time (e.g., Meynaud 1969), Roszak follows Hannah Arendt
(1976), Herbert Marcuse (1964), and Max Weber (Weber and Eisenstadt 1968)
to focus on the way technocratic power is ‘‘the product of knowledge and
extraordinary performance’’ (Winner 1977:139). Recent work revives this
tradition to show, for example, how the assumptions and inner workings of
bureaucratic knowledge impede citizen participation (Espeland 1994;
Fischer 1990).
The location of the critique of technocratic power in the categories of
bureaucratic knowledge has a long-standing and diverse theoretical pedigree. Michel Foucault (1991:92), for example, has shown how the conceptualization of the knowledge practices of government as distinct from an
entity known as ‘‘economy’’ is an emblem of modern governmentality. Paul
Rabinow (1989) and Frank Fischer (1990) describe technocracy in terms of
particular practices of reason. From a different political point of view, the
defender of free markets F. A. Hayek decried bureaucratic planning as the
instantiation of the engineer mentality of the technocrat who believes he
has ‘‘complete control of the particular little world with which he is
concerned . . . a man whose supreme ambition is to turn the world round
him into an enormous machine’’ (1975:101 – 102).
For both Hayek and Foucault, the power of the knowledge-based
critique of technocracy lay in the identification of the limits of technocratic
knowledge. Foucault, borrowing from Adam Smith, argued that the powerful mystery of the market as ‘‘invisible hand’’ was that it remained
invisible to the planner as much as to the market participant (Gordon
1991:12). For Hayek, likewise, the repeated failure of bureaucratic planning
was simply a case of the larger failure of economic theory. The mathematical abstraction of economic planning distorted the true complexity of the

I

American Ethnologist, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 392 – 405, ISSN 0094-0496. A 2004 by the American
Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to:
Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street,
Suite 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

Real time

market, and, hence, such planning could not possibly
make accurate predictions about the future (Bockman
and Eyal 2002). This was a fundamentally temporal problem: Bureaucrats were by definition analyzing events that
had already transpired, and economic planning, therefore,
was continually behind the real-time movements of the
market (Hayek 1952). In much the same way, contemporary critics have been particularly interested in the limitations of technocratic knowledge (Latour 1996; Mitchell
2002). Students of risk, for example, critique the efforts of
scientists and planners to quantify, regulate, or plan
around the unplannable (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991).1 Ethnographic studies document the points at which bureaucracy’s targets of intervention lose faith in, and fashion
responses to, ideals of technocratic knowledge such as
‘‘transparency’’ (West and Sanders 2003).
Ethnographers of technocracy have emphasized the
way these very failures, however, become the engine of
more technocracy—the way these failures create ‘‘gaps in
the form’’ (Riles 2000:161) that serve as further ‘‘targets for
intervention’’ (Castel 1991:288). James Ferguson points out
that failure is the norm rather than the exception in
development projects but that the failures of development,
in turn, have their own productive effects: ‘‘Alongside the
institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state power
is the conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticizing
both poverty and the state’’ (1990:256). Science and technology studies (STS) scholars have technologically extended this last point to demonstrate how bureaucrats
overcome conceptual limits by inventing devices that do
the work of technocracy. Bruno Latour (1996), for example,
has described Aramis, a transportation system for the city
of Paris developed by French technocrats, as a continuation of bureaucratic politics by other means. Fabian
Muniesa (2000b) describes a technology similar to the
one at issue in this article—an automated ‘‘robot’’ built
to match trades at the Paris stock exchange—as ‘‘moral
architecture’’ developed to do what planning could not:
root out corruption in trading. Muniesa goes on to show
how, in the end, the robot’s algorithmic principles in many
respects reproduced both the inequities in the trading
system and the knowledge practices of the bureaucrats
who sought to regulate them.
The bureaucrats who are the subject of this article are
officials at the Bank of Japan, Japan’s central bank, and are
responsible for the payment system by which funds move
from one bank account to another in the economy; as
such, they would seem to be archetypal producers of
technocratic knowledge in this sense. Weber (1966:325)
himself identified central bankers’ manipulation of procedural policies, such as the workings of the payment system, as examples of bureaucratic ‘‘domination.’’ Faith in
technocracy and careful attention to its calibration are
hallmarks of Japanese politics in the 20th century (Dimock
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1968; Koschmann 2002; Morris-Suzuki 1994; Okimoto
1989; Tobioka 1993; Traweek 1999; Tsutsui 1998). Moreover, recent journalistic accounts of Japanese bureaucracy
are full of the very critiques of technocratic knowledge
practices now prevalent in the anthropology of technocracy. One recent volume, for example, asserts that ‘‘power
in Japan is masked’’ (Mikuni and Murphy 2002:38) and
emphasizes that the failures of Japanese bureaucracy are
the product of a culturally specific but, ultimately, misguided faith in bureaucracy.2
More importantly, in the aftermath of the Asian
financial crisis of the late 1990s and the consciousness
of so-called systemic risk it amplified, the failures of
technocratic knowledge that anthropologists and social
theorists identify were very much at the forefront of these
technocrats’ own minds. In the face of both the inability
of sophisticated economic models to predict economic
crisis or provide solutions to recent market problems
(Eisenbeis 1997) and current efforts by global banks to
privatize the payment system and, hence, to do away with
bureaucratic regulation altogether (American Banker
1997), these central bankers were fearful of their own
powerlessness vis-à-vis the market they were expected to
manage. As I will describe, these technocrats resolved this
crisis, in their own conception, by creating a ‘‘real-time’’
machine that, they imagined, would obviate the need for
planning altogether.
The critical anthropological vision of technocracy as a
particular knowledge practice that inherently faces its own
limits elucidates much about the character of the particular technocracy I will describe. Indeed, as I will suggest,
this thesis replicates and amplifies a discourse about
bureaucracy often heard among these technocrats themselves. The aim of this article, therefore, is not to dispute
this insight but to point to other aspects of technocratic
practice that become impervious to ethnographic analysis
when one begins from this point of view. Specifically, by
focusing on the content or categories of bureaucratic
knowledge, these critiques obscure the question of how
something comes to count as ‘‘knowledge’’ or as ‘‘not
knowledge’’ in the first place. This, in turn, has consequences for the critical project: By accepting technocrats’
claims that a (conceptual or mechanical) tool is a tool and
by proceeding to inquire what kind of tool is at issue and
what its effects might be, anthropologists commit themselves to a critique of technocratic knowledge premised on
showing the artificial, determinate, and situated nature of
seemingly transparent and universal categories such as
‘‘economy’’ that, as Timothy Mitchell points out, ‘‘leaves
the world intact. Intentionally or not, it depends upon
maintaining the absolute difference between representations and the world they represent’’ (2002:4).
To address this ethnographic limitation will require
more than simply filling in the gaps in the ethnographic
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record: As I will suggest in the conclusion, to take on these
matters will require attention to the points of affinity
between technocratic and social scientific knowledge
practices that provide the ground for premises about the
nature of knowledge that are shared between anthropologist and technocrat. It will require unwinding the terms
and practices of technocratic knowledge (anthropological
and bureaucratic), I suggest. And, here, the efforts of the
bureaucrats I describe to unwind their own technocratic
practices may provide something of a model.

Technocracy in crisis
By the time of my fieldwork in the late 1990s, Japanese
technocracy was by all accounts a practice in crisis. After
almost ten years of economic recession, the media, the
academy, and the public at large were losing faith in the
utopian promises of technocracy.3 Most importantly,
bureaucrats had their own doubts about their ability to
plan. What exactly was the source of these planners’
disquiet about technocracy—what had failed, from
bureaucrats’ point of view? A look at the perceived failures
of one technocratic project, the design of the Japanese
payment system, offers some insights.
Payment systems are sociotechnical achievements of
the first order (Millo et al. 2003). Administered by central
bankers in each country, they are the digital, legal, and
institutional apparatuses by which money is actually
transferred from one bank account to another. Every day,
banks transfer through the Japanese payment system 300
trillion yen (approximately $2.5 trillion) in approximately
20,000 transactions that represent the aggregate of millions
of individual orders (Bank of Japan 2003). They do this by
instructing the Bank of Japan’s payment systems group to
debit or credit the accounts they hold with the central
bank’s electronic clearing system, known as BOJ NET
(Figure 1).4 At the time of my fieldwork, the Bank of
Japan’s Payment Systems Division was headed by a bureaucrat in his late forties, a graduate of the University of
Tokyo and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government,
whom I will call Sato.
Bureaucrats like Sato commanded considerable prestige and respect (Koh 1989; McVeigh 1998), although they
were also the targets of jealousy and resentment of their
social privilege. Almost all were graduates of the best
Japanese universities’ departments of law or economics
and had scored high on a grueling civil service exam. Most
of the bureaucrats I knew were ardently, if paternalistically, devoted to the mission of improving welfare by carefully
managing the economy. They believed in their own intellectual capacities and technical skills, and they also shared
a sense of responsibility for the consequences of their
mistakes. Most of the bureaucrats I knew confessed a
certain Keynesian ambivalence about the market’s tenden-
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Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the clearing mechanism for a transfer of
funds between customers X and Y.

cy toward self-destabilization and, hence, believed in the
need for intervention, at the margins, through planning.5
They also were painfully aware of the limits of their actual
authority over market participants (Haley 1987).
The Payment Systems Division staff recently had
become anxiously aware of a new concern: systemic risk.
At the time of my fieldwork, BOJ NET was a so-called
designated time net settlement system (hereafter, Designated Time). Banks accumulated obligations to one another throughout the day and, then, at a designated time
each day, calculated the balance of who owed what to
whom. This netting mechanism, engineered by the Payment Systems Division, was perceived by its architects as
a small technocratic triumph, an example of the contributions of planning to the smooth functioning of the
market (Kaufman 1996:826). Planners reasoned that it
made little sense for Bank A to raise the funds to pay
Bank B one billion yen at 10:00 a.m., for example, if Bank
B needed to pay Bank A two billion yen in a separate
transaction at 2:00 p.m. the same day. The central bankers
therefore had laboriously worked out the details of a
system by which banks extended each other credit
throughout the day and settled all their transactions at
once, at a designated time. In this sense, Designated Time
was a common example of technocratic progress through
conceptual and institutional systemic integration: To its
engineers, Designated Time was a conceptually sophisticated system because it was premised on the understanding that net balances were functionally equivalent to the
sum total of individual transactions. In institutional terms,
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also, it represented bureaucrat-led coordination in the
service of the common good.
As they contemplated their Designated Time system,
however, these planners noticed that the very interconnectedness they had so carefully engineered created a new
danger of its own: If one bank was unable to meet its
obligations to pay others at the designated time, this, in
turn, could leave others without the cash to meet their own
obligations, and, hence, create a ‘‘domino effect’’ (Folkerts-Landau et al. 1996:1) that would lead to systemic
failure (Bank of Japan 1996). Although systemic risk
indexed bureaucratic failure, its very discovery was in itself
a kind of technocratic achievement, from the planners’
point of view. It could only be detected through careful
contemplation of their system as an integrated and objectified whole (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Riles 2000;
Stinchcombe 2001). They would not expect market participants, who, in their view, did not think about the market in
systemic terms, to have an adequate appreciation of systemic risk.
I mentioned earlier that anthropologists and social
theorists who point to the limits of technocracy most often
locate these limits in the particular substance and character of technocratic knowledge. It is a view that the bureaucrats I knew largely shared. These bureaucrats often
described themselves and their place in the market in
terms of the special qualities of their knowledge. In particular, as they went about recalibrating the market, planners imagined two sides (Strathern 1988). On one side,
bureaucrats, but also academics and some prominent
lawyers and executives, created and maintained systems
through planning.6 These persons were proximate outsiders, in bureaucrats’ own conception. They worked at
the threshold of the market they enabled and protected,
looking in. On the other side, actual market participants
acted within the market but did not think about it in
systemic terms (Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Miyazaki
2003). Who was a market participant and who was a
builder of the market varied situationally. At one moment,
a bank executive might epitomize the market participant,
whereas at another moment he (all such executives I knew
were men) might be imaged as an institution builder. In
this fairly rigid and formalistic sociological view, therefore,
what differentiated the two sides was the character of
their knowledge.
Moreover, if for Hayek as for Foucault, the failures of
technocracy reflected the limits of economic reason, then,
for these bureaucrats, systemic risk drew attention to the
same. At the time of my fieldwork, central bankers in
Japan and elsewhere were coming to view systemic risk
as ultimately incalculable in economic terms. The problem was not simply computational complexity; some of
the risks involved—uncertainty about what law might
apply to a particular bank failure or how that law would
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be interpreted, for example—were altogether outside the
realm of what could be quantified, in these technocrats’
view. Like Hayek, they struggled with the temporal incongruity between the retrospective methods of positivist
science and the prospective demands of the market
(Hayek 1952; cf. Miyazaki 2003). As another payment
systems expert, Robert Eisenbeis, director of research at
the American Federal Reserve in Atlanta, put it, ‘‘Systems,
instruments, and markets are evolving faster than the
political entities can bring their various rules and regulations into harmony’’ (1997:50).
Yet bureaucrats’ own claims for or against their
knowledge practices notwithstanding, this focus on the
inner workings of economic knowledge does not fully
capture the character of the crisis of planning these
bureaucrats confronted. For the bureaucrats I knew, two
other kinds of problems complemented and even superseded problems of economic calculability. The first of
these was in a sense a product of the very sociological
thinking about the market that these bureaucrats embraced. In the last five years, bureaucrats had come under
repeated attack from domestic and foreign media, politicians, and academics for failing to maintain the proper
bureaucratic distance from the market—for muddying the
logic of two sides. Ideological calls for ‘‘freeing the invisible hand’’ charged that Japanese bureaucrats were coddling the banks, stepping in to save them from bankruptcy
when market logic demanded that they be left to fail
(Porter and Takeuchi 1999:77). Hence, the banks did not
internalize the costs of their inefficient behavior, and they
did not take seriously the Central Bank’s own threats to
impose so-called market discipline—its threats to refuse to
intervene in moments of crisis. The point here was not so
much the weaknesses of economic knowledge as the
personal weaknesses of the technocrat—his excessive intimacy with the market and his inability to control his own
urge for benevolent intervention.
And there was another source to the crisis. As numerous observers have commented, Japanese bureaucrats
maintain elaborate contacts with their classmates working
in the industries they regulate (Schaede 1995).7 At the Bank
of Japan, these relations were actively promoted through
research fellowships for employees of major banks to
spend a year working at the central bank, through informal
study groups of bureaucrats, lawyers, and academics of
roughly the same age, and through more formal committees of bureaucrats, academics, and representatives of
industry (shingikai). Bank officials went to elaborate ends
to cultivate these relationships: Senior bank staff told me
that one of the purposes of sending young employees to
pursue advanced degrees at elite institutions overseas was
to give them an opportunity to develop close friendships
with other Japanese of their own age. In the late 1990s,
however, a number of corruption scandals focused on
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bureaucrats’ practice of drinking and dining with their
clients. What was at stake were bureaucrats’ personal
relations. Young bureaucrats I knew roundly criticized
their seniors for what they saw as an outdated style of
governance, the opposite of rationality (cf. Kelly 1986). At
the end of an evening at a local restaurant, after dividing
the bill with me down to the last yen and then requesting a
receipt demonstrating that she had done so, Shimizu, a
Bank of Japan employee in her early thirties, attacked what
she termed the ‘‘arrogance and hegemonic behavior’’ of
those who turned bureaucratic problems into personal
relations and vice versa. Their error, she explained, was
their failure to ‘‘keep things objective.’’ Accepting entertainment from clients represented a deviation from proper
bureaucratic practice, that is, the procurement and dissemination of knowledge on a rational basis.
If Shimizu’s critique cast corruption in knowledge
terms—as a problem of rationality and objectivity—those
bureaucrats who sought to defend themselves against
charges of corruption also cast their relationships with
market participants as instrumental to bureaucratic
knowledge. Central bankers regularly ‘‘made use’’ of personal friendships to ‘‘collect information,’’ I was repeatedly told (Murakami and Rohlen 1987). Their task
depended on—indeed, principally consisted in—gathering
and dispersing information, on knowing the intimate
details of what was happening within each institution,
before it happened, and on coordinating a solution before
problems mushroomed out of control, they lamented
(Pempel and Muramatsu 1995:68). Often, these bureaucrats defended their actions in terms of neoclassical economic theories of market knowledge in which, because the
market immediately absorbs knowledge into price, knowledge that is publicly held is, by definition, already worthless. If they waited to address the market’s problems until
everything had become publicly known and stock prices
had plummeted, they would surely be blamed for failing to
act quickly enough, they lamented.
Yet the instrumental rubric of knowledge acquisition
at work in both the critiques of corruption and the
defenses of bureaucratic relations did not do justice to
the character of these relationships, as I observed them.
First, political scientists and legal scholars have repeatedly
noted that relationships between Japanese bureaucrats
and their clients serve another instrumental purpose:
Where the legal authority of Japanese bureaucrats to
impose their policies is weak, personal obligation often
substitutes for legal obligation (Haley 1987). But what is
also not accounted for in this alternative instrumental
explanation is the pleasure bureaucrats derived from
friendship. Encounters between bureaucrats and clients
proceeded according to a pattern. During the day, the two
sides held formal encounters on government premises.8
Sometimes these meetings took place in front of the
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division manager, who sat at his desk pretending to read
the newspaper as his junior carefully executed the interview. Usually on the night of the meeting, however, the
clients would treat the junior bureaucrat to dinner (with
his superior’s tacit knowledge and approval), and after
several rounds of drinks and conversation about a standard set of light topics, the conversation would turn back
to the matter of that day (cf. Allison 1994). Both sides
would take pleasure in breaking through the boundaries of
formality they had created for themselves earlier and in
‘‘speaking in a straightforward way.’’ Promises would be
made that would serve as the basis of later action.
In response to the new discourse of accountability in
the press and among bureaucrats themselves (Gupta
1995; cf. Jean-Klein 2002), the Bank of Japan had instituted a new policy: Henceforth, every meeting with
clients would have to be cleared in advance with a
manager and documented after the fact. The ironic effect
of this policy was to place me as an ethnographer truly in
the position of the participant-observer, because the
difficulties I would encounter in maintaining relations
with and seeking information from bureaucrats as a result
of this policy were much like the difficulties they encountered every day in their relations with their clients. We
shared a kind of technocratic crisis: Senior staff in particular complained of paralysis. Contacting market participants was the heart of what bureaucrats do, they
began to claim (Holmes and Marcus in press). Yet, under
the new policy, contacts with market participants were
limited to office meetings that produced formulaic
answers to predetermined questions and in which the
parties did not feel free to make quiet requests for favors
or compromises. Failure was built into technocratic practice insofar as the very technology of bureaucratic action
was the subversion of formality (cf. Valverde 2003), of
autonomy, and of the sociology of two sides. This is what
one senior bureaucrat meant when he lamented that ‘‘we
don’t know anything about the market anymore.’’
It was in this context of failure, apprehended as a
failure of knowledge, that, at the time of my fieldwork, the
Payment Systems Division staff were planning to change
their system entirely. Unlike the old Designated Time
system, the new system, known as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS; hereafter, Real Time), proposed to settle
each transaction individually and in full, in real time, that
is, at the very moment an order to transfer funds was given
(Bank of Japan 1998).9
As I noted earlier, ethnographies of bureaucracy, from
anthropology to science studies, would predict that the
payment system staff’s discovery of systemic risk in the
Designated Time system, and the wider crises of bureaucratic knowledge of which it was a part, would serve as an
invitation to further planning projects, to building new
systems. And, indeed, as a result of the discovery of
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systemic risk, division staff members were busy solving
technical glitches, training market participants, testing
their systems, and devising policies to handle contingencies as they had so many times before. Moreover, if, as
Hayek suggests, planning was conceived as inherently one
step behind the movements of the market, the sheer fact of
moving to real-time transactions projected an aura of
technocratic progress (cf. Weston 2002). Staff members
also were fond of reminding me that Real Time constituted
progress along another axis as well. Sato had first learned
about Real Time at global conferences of central bankers
from around the world. The move to Real Time was a
‘‘global trend’’ among central bankers (Johnson 1998;
Kodres 1996), he emphasized, a small but crucial step
toward ever greater international ‘‘harmonization’’ (cf.
Drucker 1998).10
Indeed, using terms very close to those of science
studies scholars, these bureaucrats talked of Real Time as
a kind of step forward born out of the discovery of failure,
that is, as a machine that synthesized law and technology
to solve political problems surrounding the limits of economic knowledge. Real Time was, for them, a hybrid
artifact. It demanded complex computer networks and
programs, and one team within the division devoted itself
to such issues as improving the speed of data transfer and
creating backup systems. But it also demanded new laws
and regulations, new policies, and new norms. Sato’s
ultimate objective was to write into the very architecture
of the machine these standards of good market practice
(Muniesa 2000a).
Yet if bureaucrats presented Real Time as just another
technocratic advance, on closer examination, there was
something puzzling about it from this point of view. This
was most apparent in the opposition Real Time generated
among economists and market participants: Employees of
the banks that used the payment system, who by now had
come to see how Designated Time saved them money,
complained loudly that it would be far more costly to clear
their transactions individually, in real time, because they
would have to raise funds to meet each individual payment
throughout the day. Economists, likewise, insisted that
Designated Time was by far the wiser system because it
saved money and avoided delays (Angelini 1998; Kahn and
Roberds 1998; VanHoose 1991). By settling each transaction in the ‘‘now’’ of Real Time, in other words, Real Time
replaced the very systemic knowledge that was the hallmark of economic and technocratic intervention, and to
which market participants by now had learned to submit,
with millions of discrete and individualized units of rights
and obligations.
Real Time was not so much a new machine, therefore,
as the unwinding of systemic knowledge, a return to how
things had been prior to technocratic interventions that
had produced Designated Time in the first place. In
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practice, Real Time was more like a fuse box than a
supercomputer: Henceforth, it would not be necessary to
plan for systemic crises in the payment system because
Real Time would keep each transaction separate and,
hence, prevent risk from spreading like falling dominoes
through the system. Like the bank’s policy on contact with
outsiders, in other words, Real Time represented a defensive strategy—it responded to bureaucrats’ own doubts
about their ability to plan for the market by minimizing the
consequences of market failure. But Real Time was also
more perpetual motion machine than lever (Crook n.d.):
By giving up the system, the central bank was also giving
up one of its important means of intervention in the
economy (Sato 1998). Hence, there would be neither the
need for nor the tools of technocratic intervention.
Real Time therefore did not so much solve a problem
of knowledge or continue politics by other means as
express a particular kind of agency and respond to a
particular desire—a ‘‘peculiar sort of modesty’’ premised
on ‘‘self-invisibility’’ (Haraway 1997:32), a desire for an
endpoint to knowledge itself (Miyazaki and Riles in press).
In this respect, Sato enthusiastically encouraged market
participants to develop private solutions to clearing that
would decrease their reliance on the central bank altogether. ‘‘Sometimes [market participants] say these issues
should not be fixed as a market practice but through
guidelines from the Bank of Japan, but we refuse. We
say, we’re going to prepare a very flat table. And what
kinds of plates and saucers you put on it is your own
work,’’ he told me.
Yet what most clearly defined Real Time as an endpoint to technocratic knowledge was what would happen
to social relations under the new system. Ultimately, it was
the impact of Real Time on the character of social relations
that most interested Sato. He excitedly described how Real
Time would encourage ‘‘self-responsibility’’ among market participants by requiring each to post collateral for the
full value of his transactions in advance. Sato reflected in
vivid detail to me about how, under Designated Time,
bankers could just sit in their offices smoking away until
the time of settlement each day. Under the new system,
however, every second would count, and bankers would be
forced to become far more alert, efficient, and nimble in
their thinking. The initial chaos of Real Time, Sato argued,
would eventually give way to a deeper level of order guided
by ‘‘market practice.’’ The difference would be that this
new order would emerge on its own, from the aggregation
of the actions of individuals, rather than as an artifact of
his and others’ planning. Social relations would cease to be
tools, in other words, and become objects in the market,
defined precisely by the way they were not a target of
technocratic intervention. It is difficult to imagine a more
powerful fantasy of the abdication of technocratic knowledge than this image of turning one’s own tools into their
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very opposite, an object in the market, on which one
chooses not to act.
So far, I have shown that, like anthropologists of
technocracy, these technocrats readily asserted that failures or faults of technocratic knowledge provided the
impetus for further technocratic knowledge projects. In
these technocrats’ ideological vision, knowledge was additive—knowledge (and its failures) begat more knowledge.
Yet I have emphasized how these knowledge claims occluded a number of other dimensions of technocratic
practice. First, social relations, imagined as something
outside of and beyond knowledge, served, in bureaucrats’
own view, as the very engine of technocratic knowledge
and also its demise. But, second, even this notion of the
social occluded something else—friendship, valued for its
own sake as well as for the way personal relations generated information. And, third, I have sought to draw attention to another technocratic fantasy that exists alongside
the fantasy of additive knowledge, like a kind of undertow—the fantasy of the endpoint to technocracy, of abdication of authority, of unwinding. The first step in my
argument, therefore, is to suggest that ethnographers of
technocracy take the moment of technocratic unwinding
as seriously as they take moments of technocratic building
and expansion.

Needs
Despite all the anxiety, the paralysis, and the fantasy of
unwinding knowledge and relations I have described, Sato
surprised me one day, after we had talked of the technicalities of Real Time over many weeks, when he told me
that he ultimately expected the relationship between the
Bank of Japan and market participants to change very
little. ‘‘We decided to let the market participants go where
they like,’’ he said, ‘‘but we think they will make the right
choices, they will settle in an acceptable zone.’’ To my
suggestion that once cut loose, the banks might go too
far—they might, for example, develop their own private
clearing system that would eliminate the need for the
central bank altogether—Sato responded with skepticism.
He could always create incentives for them to come back
to the clearing system. And if nothing else, market participants would clear through the central bank some of the
time because they needed banknotes.
A need for banknotes? The reference to concrete,
physical money was shocking to me in a world of electronic transfers and numbers on balance sheets. In fact, it
was the first time in the course of my fieldwork that I had
been made aware of how paper money entered the system
of electronic accounts. No one had ever discussed it, and I
had not thought about it. Paper money had been invisible
from the point of view of the technocrats’ knowledge
practices and my own.
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Slowly I became aware of other such artifacts of the
unwinding of technocratic knowledge. As planning for Real
Time reached its final stages, an executive of one of Japan’s
largest banks worried that ‘‘the biggest problem of all is the
central bank’s role—to provide liquidity during the daytime.’’ What emerged, for him, from the purposeful unwinding of technocracy into Real Time that I have
described was a need: In the years of Designated Time,
banks had relied on the fact that they did not need funds to
settle their transactions until the end of the day, and the
number of transactions had increased exponentially. Yet, if
every transaction henceforth had to be settled on the spot,
banks needed liquidity—cash—to meet their obligations in
real time. The effect of Real Time for bankers like this
executive, then, was a move from an awareness of system
and systemic risk to an awareness of liquidity—a move
from knowledge of systems to something of a different
order, needs. The Payment Systems Division staff likewise
repeatedly drew my attention to these needs. One team
member even hastily sketched out a powerful image that
emphatically articulates needs in the form of negative
balances that member banks would incur in their accounts
with the Bank of Japan between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5
p.m. each day (Figure 2).
This conversion of risks into needs is not outside the
technocratic vocabulary of planning and systems I have
described. Traditional philosophical justifications for the
welfare state and its planning, for example, are grounded
in the satisfaction of individual and social needs (Walzer
1984). In fact, it is possible to understand the larger
technocratic vocabulary of risk management that Real

Figure 2. Drawing produced by a Payment Systems Division official during
the course of a conversation about Real Time with me.
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Time deployed as heir to an earlier, equally technocratic
vocabulary of (social) needs (Mariana Valverde, personal
communication June 24, 2002). In the academic context,
likewise, Marshall Sahlins (1996) has shown, with respect
to both anthropological functionalism and neoclassical
economic analysis, that the corollary to social scientists’
fascination with self-perpetuating systems is a notion of
needs as ‘‘pure materiality,’’ something outside the system
that renders it eternally necessary, as when society is a
function of biological needs or markets are a function of
needs for liquidity. I want to suggest, therefore, that
anthropologists think of systems and needs as a kind of
pair. But what is important is that, unlike knowledge and
social relations or bureaucracy and corruption, this particular pair is not immediately apprehensible as such by its
users (technocrat or academic). Needs are not a ‘‘subject’’
in the anthropology of bureaucracy, for example. My
ethnographic claim, in other words, is that the notion of
‘‘needs’’ works as a counterpart to technocratic knowledge
that is readily available within the technocratic idiom and
yet not immediately apprehensible as such.
Once needs become visible ethnographically as a
technocratic resource, it will be apparent to readers that
their emergence at this moment of unwinding technocratic knowledge, in turn, created a new technocratic opportunity. In particular, from the point of view of needs for
liquidity, Real Time represented a reassertion of technocratic authority in a different guise. The movement to Real
Time was a movement from an older system of interdependence, in which the banks extended credit to one
another, to a system in which each bank became individually dependent on the central bank alone to fulfill its
intraday credit needs. ‘‘We are prepared to supply intraday
overdraft to support RTGS,’’ Sato told me with a mixture of
gravity and triumph, as I voiced market participants’
concern about the need for liquidity. The Bank of Japan
would loan funds to the users of its payment system—
allow them to keep negative balances until the end of the
day—so that they could meet their obligations in real time.
But this was easier said than done. As the bank executive
quoted above told me, ‘‘[The central bank] has 3 trillion
yen in all the accounts put together. But 30 trillion yen is
needed to keep this system going.’’ In other words, the
banks’ needs for liquidity also highlighted the Bank of
Japan’s own needs—and the difficulties it would have
meeting the needs of its charges. The Bank of Japan
emerged as a silent provider of needs that drew its strength
from a kind of explicit weakness and from the performance
of the awesome feat of providing the impossible but
acutely necessary at the moment of need.11
But if it is possible to see provision for needs as the
continuation of technocratic politics by other means, in
much the same way that STS scholars have shown bureaucratic technologies to be, it is important to take note of
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how this was accomplished. It was not the content of
technocratic knowledge that did the work here, as critics
of technocracy, from Foucault to Hayek, would suggest,
but, rather, the stopping and unwinding of technocratic
knowledge and its replacement by a kind of action (the
provision for needs) recognizable from inside the practice
of technocracy but occluded from technocrats’ view by
their own knowledge-based claims. This unwinding was
possible because of the particular features of needs as
entities already inside the sphere of technocratic practice
but also outside, utterly unrelated, irrelevant to technocratic knowledge—pure materiality, as Sahlins puts it. That
is, the problem of needs obviated all earlier concerns and
anxieties surrounding the logic of two sides, for bureaucrats as for politicians, market participants, and journalistic and academic observers alike—it simply fell outside the
scope of representational practice.12 Unlike the technocrats’ transformation of social relations into knowledge,
the transformation of risk into needs did not yield an
object of contemplation or critique. I never heard people
like Shimizu, the bank employee who critiqued her superiors’ indulgence in social relations, make an issue of
needs, for example. And Sato’s efforts to provide liquidity
did not pose a contradiction, in his own mind, with his
commitment to maintaining the proper bureaucratic distance from the market. In other words, the power of needs
as technocratic practice was that it was not particularly
perceptible as technocratic strategy to technocrats themselves. I surmise that it is precisely because the logic of
needs is so much of a piece with the logic of systems—
because needs are so intimate to knowledge—that they
became available as a site at which technocratic knowledge itself disappeared.

Unwinding anthropological knowledge
As I have presented it here, this insight about the work that
is done by moving from what registers as knowledge to
what does not count as knowledge, from technocrats’
point of view, seems straightforward. But it highlights a
simple but intractable problem for critics who focus on the
nature of technocratic knowledge: The very knowledge
practice that would seek to identify the politics of technocracy in this case is incapable of doing so—because that
politics works precisely by virtue of its existence beyond
knowledge, for the technocrat as for technocracy’s critic.
To address the problem requires confronting the ways in
which anthropology is of a piece with its object of critique,
technocratic knowledge. The ethnographic moment when
I, personally, could resist this insight no longer came when
Sato himself admonished me, as a researcher, to pay
particular attention to ‘‘the location of power in the
market.’’ Another marker of this problem is the way, as
mentioned at the outset, that the critiques of the power of
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technocracy are already anticipated and elaborated by
journalists and even by technocrats themselves.
In drawing attention to this problem, I build on a
growing body of work that emphasizes the parallels between technocratic and anthropological or social scientific
knowledge. Holmes and Marcus describe the knowledge
practices of central bankers as ‘‘paraethnographic’’ to
emphasize that the ‘‘informants of ethnography must be
rethought as counterparts rather than ‘others’ ’’ (in press).
Carol Greenhouse and Marilyn Strathern point to the ways
categories, such as ‘‘state’’ (Greenhouse 2002) or ‘‘audit’’
(Strathern 2000), serve as analogs for anthropological
categories, such as ‘‘society’’ or ‘‘culture.’’ Bill Maurer
(2002) and I (Riles 2000) have emphasized parallels at
the level of form between anthropological and technocratic knowledge practices. Frank Fischer (1990:16 – 17) and
Nigel Thrift (1996:12), in different ways, highlight the
shared positivist assumptions of technocracy and its critics. Technocracy in this body of work emerges as a point
at which anthropological representations and the world
they represent come together in certain shared practices
of knowledge.
But what interests me here is the particular problem
this condition poses for ethnography and for critical work.
How can anthropologists, who work within the same
intellectual traditions as the technocrats I have described,
apprehend precisely that which garners its power from its
inaccessibility to technocratic knowledge? Here is where
anthropologists need some unwinding of our own knowledge from the technocratic practices I have described:
What was imperceptible to the technocrat was also imperceptible to the ethnographer.
I suggest that unwinding anthropological knowledge is
first and foremost an ethnographic project, rather than an
analytical one. The analytical work is straightforward and
after the fact, the ethnographic work discouragingly difficult. In the example I have provided, the work of seeing the
politics of Real Time lay in making needs available as a
subject of ethnographic description. But once this ethnographic work was accomplished, the analysis of that subject looked so entirely obvious that it engendered a further
problem of reception: Readers accustomed to straightforward presentations of data followed by baroque analytics
will feel that the material is left unanalyzed. So, what is
required to make evident the nature of unwinding, as
anthropological practice, is a kind of violation of the
aesthetics of anthropological representation—I need to
retrace how the ethnographic work was done, to show
how the unwinding took place.
In the course of my fieldwork, I sometimes encountered a jarring statement from the executives of the private
banks that the Bank of Japan was charged with regulating:
‘‘The Bank of Japan is our mother.’’ The phrase was in no
sense pejorative or cynical; it was thrown out rather as a
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kind of shorthand, a way of giving me, the outside observer, a means of understanding what was going on. I never
heard this metaphor used by central bankers themselves,
and I suspect they would experience a certain amount of
embarrassment at its discovery and elaboration by a
foreign observer. Their quite legitimate fear, I imagine,
would be that observers would once again read into such a
metaphor a critique of their technocratic practices as
distinctly ‘‘Japanese’’ and, hence, as somehow less than
truly modern. Their fear would be that an anthropologist
would deploy such a metaphor in the service of a culturalist analysis that would seek to explain Japanese technocracy as a product of the particular features of the Japanese
cultural context. This is not at all my aim.
Instead, what was productive about this metaphor, or,
rather, the experience of encountering it, was the way it
made evident to the ethnographer certain baselines in
Euro-American anthropological knowledge practices.13 It
did not fit with my own assumptions about how to think
about government and market. In his discussion of governmentality alluded to above, for example, Foucault
contrasts modern technocratic knowledge with ‘‘pastoralism’’—with a notion of the state as a father figure in which
economy is ‘‘the correct manner of managing individuals,
goods and wealth within the family’’ (1991:92). What
would be elucidated about central bankers’ practices by
thinking about motherhood, I wondered? Prompted by
this disjuncture, I began to conduct parallel fieldwork
among mothers and sons in one upper-middle-class suburb of Tokyo, of the kind in where many of the bankers I
met in the city had grown up or currently lived.
The ground for the metaphor, for my Japanese interlocutors, was a taken-for-granted notion of the household.
As Chie Nakane (1967) argued in her classic critique of the
application of structural functionalist kinship theory to
Japanese society, the Japanese household is first and last
an economic unit. The association of the household with
finance is so strong that, in popular conversation, the word
kitchen (daidokoro) serves as shorthand for a firm’s financial condition (as in the question, ‘‘how are things in the
kitchen?’’). Since the Meiji period, official state ideology
has asserted that mothers should serve as managers of the
household economy, and, hence, motherhood is readily
associated with economic productivity (Nolte and Hastings 1991:171 – 172) and financial expertise, such that men
often refer to their wives as ‘‘our minister of finance’’ (uchi
no okura daijin). In drawing together household and
economy, therefore, my interlocutors did not relate two
disparate domains. I imagine that they had no idea that
what, from their point of view, was quite mundane phrasing was confusing to me.
At issue, also, was a particular understanding of the
politics of motherhood. As sociologist and feminist theorist Ueno Chizuko (1994) has commented, the Japanese
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mother is the dominant figure in the household. Her
dominance has emerged because and in spite of her
structurally weak position since the postwar invention of
the role of full-time wife and mother (Ueno 1988).14 As
implied by the mildly derogatory phrase ‘‘education mommy’’ (kyouiku mama), the values at once cherished and
feared in a mother are commitment, endurance, and
single-mindedness about doing what it takes to see to the
child’s success in the competitive educational system (Allison 1996; Lebra 1984:192 – 208).15 Ueno observes that in the
Japanese family, the mother’s authority is always receding,
for, in encouraging her children to be different from and
more successful than their father, she is also encouraging
them to leave her behind. For the mothers and sons I knew,
this awareness that the relationship must become attenuated over time was precisely what rendered it continually
new and strong. Because a son spends most of his life
pulling away, he, in effect, always remains close. According
to the popular press, mothers’ inability to give up their
excessive concern for the affairs of their sons results in the
weak character of adult men and is singled out as a social
problem, the ‘‘mother complex’’ (mazakon). Hence, in
referring to the Bank of Japan as ‘‘our mother,’’ market
participants most likely flagged the intimate involvement
of the Bank of Japan in the problems of Japanese banks and
the willingness of its staff to share in a very personal way in
the burdens of Japanese financial institutions.
Yet, for these bankers, the metaphor also would have
flagged power. Ueno’s description of how the Japanese
mother is able to carve from a position of structural
weakness a kind of dominance within the household aptly
captures the central bank’s position in the Japanese market, as I have shown. Fieldwork drew my attention to the
awesome power the mothers I knew derived within the
household from their devotion to a managerial role imagined, as with Foucault’s pastorialism, to concern economy
in the widest and most intimate sense of personal and
collective welfare and growth. The mother was, for middleaged, successful, and driven sons, an icon of intervention
of a conflictual, moderately repulsive, and sometimes even
violent, but ultimately unavoidable, kind.
In the practice of thinking about one ethnographic
domain by working through another, I found further
metaphorical possibilities of my own. In particular, the
mothers and sons I knew were intimate in a way that was
impervious to articulation. In fact, they seemed to go out
of their way to avoid such articulation, to the point at times
of expressing a certain degree of frustration at my fascination with mother – son relations. Mothers and sons I
knew did not verbalize affection toward one another, as
Euro-American mothers and children routinely feel compelled to do. Mothers seemed far more interested in the
task of providing for concrete needs, such as assuring the
proper combination of vegetables at dinner or a quiet
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place to study, than in giving explicit advice or making
rules for their children (Kondo 1990). As they grew older,
sons and mothers made constant demands on one another
that went unnoticed, unaccounted for, by both sides.
Whereas most kinds of social relations were carefully
calibrated, always tricky to negotiate, mothers and sons
of all ages tolerated a seemingly infinite amount of imposition and even hostility from one another. It would be
impossible, in other words, to think of mothers and sons as
two sides. Hence, their puzzling assertions to me, in light
of the constant demands I observed, that they had no
relationship at all.
The work this metaphor did for me as ethnographic
practice, in other words, was to push me to think about what
was not relations and, hence, not knowledge. In particular,
it located a new ethnographic artifact—intimacy—a condition of oneness within which it is possible honestly to
insist that no relationship exists, indeed, to experience
and assert not connection but repulsion. It made visible
a form of politics imperceptible with the current tools of
political critique.
Mine is a simple, even impressionistic account of
unwinding. But I offer it here to call for more serious
attention to the work of ethnographic practice, as distinct
from theory and analysis, in conditions of intimacy between anthropological knowledge and the knowledge
practices, such as technocracy, that it seeks to represent.
Indeed, to suggest that there are parallels between technocratic knowledge and anthropology’s own knowledge
practices would be far too weak a statement. I have been
describing fieldwork in anthropologists’ own categories: a
sociological understanding of market, premised at an
ideological level on the authority of science but ultimately
fueled by a faith in social relations, and one that is
increasingly attuned to its limits such that it entertains
fantasies of its own unwinding. Here I can only account
after the fact for how the jarring sensibility of a metaphor,
drawn idiosyncratically from the material, served not as a
means of elucidating a cultural truth but as a way of
ethnographically unwinding the agreed bases of anthropological and planning knowledge that make the ethnography of technocracy so intractable in the first place.
Let me restate this another way. Materials like those
presented here are very much a part of the anthropologist’s world, and, yet, they are also highly exotic. Unlike the
exoticism that fueled earlier generations of anthropology,
however, payment systems do not seem to invite anthropological reflection. Like needs for the technocrats I have
described, these technocratic practices hide themselves
not by their strangeness but by denying the anthropologist
the cues or hooks that engage the analytical imagination.
They do not present themselves as another side to anthropology’s own intellectual concerns. This is the hallmark
of intimacy.
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As an ethnographic subject, therefore, technocracy
raises questions about how a subject engages or remains
inaccessible to the anthropological imagination in the first
place. The example I have offered of the conversion of
technocratic knowledge into the unnoticed, untheorized
fulfillment of needs provides an apt metaphor for how
subjects become invisible, inaccessible to analysis—by
bureaucrats and anthropologists alike. My contribution
to this problem has been to draw attention to two dimensions of anthropological practice other than representation
or analysis—to the act of ethnographic unwinding and to
the act of the reception of the anthropological text—that
serve as resources at this juncture precisely because they
are not technocratic—they are not common to anthropologists and their technocratic subjects. Rather, like needs
for the technocrats I have described, these two dimensions
are part of the task and yet invisible, occluded by our own
analytical practices. Perhaps the moment is ripe for further
unwindings of our own.
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1. In a recent book, for example, Lee Clarke (1999) has drawn
attention to what he describes as ‘‘fantasy documents’’—institutional documents that ostensibly plan for unquantifiable risks or
extraordinary disasters but whose real purpose is to serve as
‘‘rationality badges’’ that assure the institution, the public, and
its various constituencies that, in the event of a certain disaster,
the institution would know how to act.
2. Marilyn Ivy warns that anthropologists should be particularly
suspicious of these ubiquitous critiques of Japanese culture and
suggests that anthropologists understand these anxieties, rather,
as statements about ‘‘the dialectically entwined status of the
United States (as the paradigm of the West) and Japan as national-cultural imaginaries’’ (1995:3).
3. The U.S. bond-rating agency, Moody’s, had even downgraded Japanese government bonds (JGB) in what bureaucrats
took as a humiliating suggestion that the government itself was
not entirely on sound financial footing (Dore 1999).
4. BOJ NET handles transfers of cash from the accounts of 916
member banks. It handles ‘‘wholesale’’ fund transfers (between
banks on behalf of their individual clients or between participants
in a special foreign exchange clearing system). In addition to cash,
BOJ NET also handles transfers of JGBs.
5. Laura Hein (2003) has shown how, in the postwar period,
Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats have understood the technocratic manipulation of capitalist economic models as a
progressive project associated with anti-imperialism (cf. Harootunian 2000:101). Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1994:163) describes how
the ideology of a technocratic project in the service of militarism
in prewar Japan was effortlessly converted into an ideology of
technocracy in the service of democracy and economic growth in
the postwar period and how the technocratic dimension of U.S.
politics held particular appeal for Japanese elites. Likewise, in his
exposition of debates among bureaucrats and their intellectual
advisors in the prewar period, Vic Koschmann (2002) demonstrates that Japanese technocrats shared a concern with the
‘‘crisis of capitalism’’—the disunities and imbalances it creates
and the need to offset those imbalances through bureaucratic
intervention.
6. Bank executives often serve as semipublic figures in Japan;
they represent their industries on government committees and
devote a considerable amount of their time to drafting regulations
and working with bureaucrats on policy issues. In this role, they
are expected to speak for their industry as a whole, rather than to
represent the interests of their own institutions (although in
practice their efforts often favor their own institutions’ interests
in subtle ways).
7. Until recently, Japanese bureaucrats usually retired to positions as titular heads of private corporations, from which they
continued to serve as conduits between government and industry
(Calder 1989).
8. Each bank and securities firm assigned particular employees
the full-time responsibility of meeting regularly, both during the
day and after work, with bureaucrats in each ministry that regulated their activities (cf. Schwartz 1998:187).
9. Real Time ultimately went into operation on January 4, 2001.
10. Real Time was first implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the bank failures of the 1980s.
11. How the Payment Division staff solved this problem is
a fascinating but highly technical story beyond the scope of
this article.
12. In this respect, it is ethnographically significant, in my view,
that the Real-Time system received no academic attention and
practically no journalistic attention and was also ignored by the
politicians who routinely critique the Japanese bureaucracy.
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13. I use the awkward phrase ‘‘Euro-American anthropological
knowledge practices’’ to distinguish the work of Japanese anthropologists, which, in my opinion, does not always replicate the
particular assumptions about knowledge and market at issue here.
14. Unlike in the ideology of the middle-class, Euro-American
family defined by ‘‘horizontal intimacy founded on the romantic
sexual intimacy of one man and one woman’’ (Fineman 1995:145),
as Nakane puts it, ‘‘the structure of the [Japanese] family is based
on a central core, mother and children, to which husband (father)
attaches’’ (1970:132).
15. As Kathleen Uno (1999) has pointed out, this ideology of
motherhood as complete devotion to the education of children
obscures the variety of actual practices of motherhood in Japan,
including, in particular, those of rural and working-class women
(cf. Allison 1996:xiv). On the expectations of midcentury employers of ‘‘salary men’’ about the full-time devotion of their employees’ wives to motherhood, see Rohlen 1974.
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